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Since 2008, the world has experienced several dramatic events: the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–08, the earthquake in Japan,
the sovereign debt crisis and the revolutions in the Arab world. All of these developments have called into question
not just our current policies, but also the measurement systems on which we base their conﬁguration. What we mea-
sure affects what we do. Increasingly, there is a demand to go beyond measures of market activity (GDP) and towards
measures of wellbeing. Reductions in wellbeing (following deteriorations in people’s physical and psychological health,
community life or employment status, or in the provision of environmental goods) that are accepted in the name of
maximization of material wealth results in totally misguided policies. This article surveys some recent and clear
instances in which our measurements have gone wrong, and suggests revisions that may translate into better informed
and more sustainable policies.
The shortcomings of our metrics
Since 2008, the world has experienced several dramatic
events: the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–08, the earthquake in
Japan, the sovereign debt crisis and the revolutions in
the Arab world. All of these developments have called
into question not just our current policies, but also
the measurement systems on which we base their
conﬁguration.
The ‘ﬁnancial’ crisis revealed that we were not doing
as well as the available metrics led us to believe. The
ways in which we were trying to grow economically
turned out to be fragile, or otherwise unsustainable, with
output measures having been exaggerated by bubble
prices in real estate, as well as by ﬁctional proﬁts in the
ﬁnancial sector. In some countries (such as the US), GDP
has now returned to precrisis level, but that does not in
any way account for a palpable diminution in the general
sense of wellbeing of people. Almost one out of six
Americans would like a full-time job, the availability of
which is limited; others face high anxiety about the risk
of losing their current employment and homes; others
still are threatened with signiﬁcant cutbacks in basic pub-
lic expenditure programmes. GDP may be looking alright,
but the loss in wellbeing is enormous.
The aftermath of the earthquake in Japan can be seen
as a metaphor of our measurement problems. Our very
thinking seems strangely out of focus. For instance, it
was suggested that, while in the short run Japan’s GDP
may have gone down, in the long run it would have
risen as a result of reconstruction efforts. Some have also
suggested that the increased sense of danger and anxi-
ety caused by the calamity might have signiﬁcant health
effects on a large section of the population, the allevia-
tion of which through drugs and treatments may
increase GDP. These claims are strange but may have a
grain of truth in them. What no one would claim, how-
ever, is that Japan is actually better off after the earth-
quake. It would require such a huge increase in GDP to
compensate for the destruction of all the kinds of capital
that the event caused, and to offset the increased anxi-
eties that so many people face in the country today, that
there is virtually no way Japan (or any country) could
ever end up being better off as a result of such a catas-
trophe. But our metrics are not capable of measuring the
value of the lost assets. The mechanical nature of our
economic models tells us nothing about the immaterial
consequences of the irreversible losses suffered by the
Japanese people. In the aftermath of the disaster, we
also realize that the measurements we were making
before the disaster were not accurate either. GDP may
have been higher then because of greater cost savings
made possible by the use of nuclear energy as opposed
to, say, renewables. Disposal policies for spent nuclear
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material that exposed the entire country to great risks,
which are all too evident now, may also have
contributed to an apparently higher GDP. The Japanese
case underlines the three major shortcomings of our
metrics: the measurement of the ‘economic product’, the
measurement of wellbeing and the measurement of
sustainability.
Another well-documented fact is intracountry increase
in inequality, which has characterized at least the past
quarter of a century; measuring GDP growth will tell us
nothing about that. And it will certainly give us a wrong
impression about the evolution of societal wellbeing. A
striking fact is that in OECD countries the increase in
income of 80 per cent of the population has been lower
than the rate of growth of the overall economy (which
is, obviously, an average) – and the more so the lower
the decile considered. If we seek numbers that assess
the impact of economic growth on society as a whole,
surely we want to know what is happening to most
people. GDP tells us nothing about that either.
Consider now the revolutions in the Arab world, espe-
cially Tunisia. Some economists construe political liberty
as a luxury good, whose pursuit and maintenance leads
to lower growth rates because it triggers a quest for
redistribution. Setting aside whether such claims rest on
sound theoretical or empirical foundations (at least in
the case of Tunisia, the lack of democracy contributed to
corruption, which had an enervating effect on growth),
here too the concept used is misleading. GDP is not a
measure of wellbeing: show that limiting political free-
dom leads to increased GDP and still (quite apart from
the inherent fragility of such empirical exercises) it will
be preposterous to conclude that countries should better
postpone democratization until they can afford this lux-
ury. It may well be that wellbeing increases more from
an increase in political liberty than from an increase in
GDP, especially given the way GDP is measured. And in
any case, in debating the effect of political liberty on the
evolution of GDP, we are missing an essential point: the
risk taken by the people who fought and ﬁght for free-
dom is testimony to the fact that freedom is a funda-
mental component of wellbeing.
These are just some examples of how ﬂaws in the
available metrics, and the absence of solid alternatives,
may mislead us towards ﬂawed policy conclusions. What
we measure affects what we do. Reducing wellbeing in
order to increase whatever imperfect measure of material
wealth we like to use results in totally misguided
policies.
Metrics and policies
Economists rely on statistical (econometric) data to make
inferences about what are good policies. Those infer-
ences are only as reliable as the data on which they are
based. Some studies suggested that ﬁnancial market or
capital market liberalization contributed to higher eco-
nomic growth, for instance, but it is now clear that such
conclusions were ﬂawed because: (1) GDP numbers were
inﬂated by the bubbles that are often associated with
such liberalizations; (2) unless an adequate time horizon
is taken, the losses that follow crashes will not be taken
into account – and these losses may more than offset
the short-term gains arising from the bubbles to which
liberalization often gives rise; (3) the distributive conse-
quences of those policies are not taken into account, so
that even if GDP goes up, it may still well be that most
citizens are worse off; and (4) the costs to wellbeing –
from, for example, the insecurity that follows the volatil-
ity that typically accompanies such liberalization
measures – are not taken into account. The empirical
studies conducted to demonstrate the beneﬁcial effect
on growth and employment of ﬁnancial market liberaliza-
tion are vulnerable to the same limitations. There is an
unfortunate correlation between some familiar policy
recommendations and the weaknesses of the evidence
supporting them.
Many advocates of unfettered markets see any inter-
vention – whether through public policy or private insti-
tutions – as welfare-decreasing. They ignore extensive
and well-documented ‘market failures’ that are especially
widespread in labour and capital markets, however.
Some institutions have been created to make up for fail-
ures in unemployment insurance markets, for instance.
Some of these institutions can be thought of as reﬂect-
ing some version of a democratic social contract. There
are winners and losers to any structural reform, so such
reform is unlikely to lead to a Pareto-improving outcome
or even to one supported by a majority of the electorate.
But, more importantly, the move towards greater labour
ﬂexibility could affect negatively at least two of the main
objective determinants of wellbeing: the quality of jobs
(the quest for a decent job) and economic security.
Again, if we select the wrong indicators, we could draw
policy recommendations whose implementation might
actually reduce the wellbeing of the people. If our met-
rics do not capture the beneﬁts of the greater security
that unemployment insurance provides, the reform that
is needed is not the abolition of unemployment
insurance, but of the ﬂawed metrics.
Another example arises in analyses of the effect of the
size of government on growth. Because output in the
public sector is typically measured by its inputs, there is
an implicit assumption of no productivity growth (when
in fact, in some cases, we know there is rapid productiv-
ity growth). Inevitably, such assumption taints cross-
country regressions to suggest that a larger public sector
is associated with smaller rates of productivity growth.
The result is not a deep empirical insight; it is simply a
statistical artefact of measurement. Consider, for instance,
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what might happen if one were to privatize America’s
social security. We know that transaction costs for that
system are one order of magnitude lower than for pri-
vate annuity programmes. The system is extraordinarily
efﬁcient as it is, and surveys have also shown that it is
very ‘customer-responsive’. Privatization would result in
higher proﬁts for America’s ﬁnancial services industry,
but lower beneﬁts for America’s retirees. The higher prof-
its would likely be reﬂected in an increase in GDP but
the wellbeing of Americans would be decreased, and the
gains of the ﬁnancial industry would be at the expense
of retirees. Wellbeing, deﬁned appropriately, would go
down.
Use and misuse of the concept of sustainability
We can do better. The Commission on the Measurement
of Economic Performance and Social Progress identiﬁed
a number of reforms. Some would lead to a better GDP
metric, so that even if GDP is not a measure of wellbeing
it is a better measure of whatever it is that it is attempt-
ing to measure. We may want to measure, for instance,
the levels of market activity – one of the original objec-
tives of national income measurement. Sometimes confu-
sion is engendered when a measure adapted to one
purpose is used to highlight another. GDP is neither a
measure of income nor a measure of wellbeing. What we
want to measure is the key question.
Increasingly, there is a demand to go beyond mea-
sures of market activity to measures of wellbeing. Even
before the crisis, there were worries about sustainability:
our metrics did not tell us anything about whether what
we were doing was sustainable. That is why some would
want to shift focus to other metrics. Looking at the (real)
income of the median individual, for example, would
give us a better picture of what is happening to the typi-
cal individual in a given society than does GDP per cap-
ita. Before the crisis, many thought that the US was
performing well; a look at the median income would
have shown that incomes were actually stagnating or
declining.
We care about the future. It is important for any soci-
ety to form an assessment, no matter how imperfect,
about whether its current consumption or wellbeing is
sustainable, and whether this is coming at the expense
of future generations. Our statistical systems should tell
us whether or not what we are doing is sustainable –
economically, environmentally, politically or socially. Most
of us believe that, at least in certain dimensions, what
we are doing is not sustainable, but current statistics do
not reﬂect this. Of course we can ascertain whether a
society’s wealth is increasing or decreasing (per capita),
and if it is increasing then we may presume that such a
society will be able to keep on doing in the future what
it is doing today, i.e. whether it can sustain its per-capita
income. But to get any useful information we need a
comprehensive measure of wealth, and we need to be
sure that the valuations are correct. A comprehensive
measure obviously includes, for instance, measures of
physical capital, human capital and natural capital
(including the environment).
One of the problems encountered in the aftermath of
the ﬁnancial crisis is the misuse of the concept of sus-
tainability. The lack of appropriate indicators of sustain-
ability may lead us to an unsustainable path, while a
partial measure may lead us to wrong policies, which
would eventually jeopardize the long-term prospects of
an economy. A case in point is Europe. Sharing a com-
mon currency in a global crisis, eurozone countries are
currently looking for sustainability indicators in order to
assess the ﬁnancial sustainability of each member coun-
try. The problem is that European countries are focusing
on a very partial view of sustainability, namely the sus-
tainability of public debt, which leads them to impose
austerity programmes on peripheral countries, i.e. pro-
cyclical policies. These will likely result in a much lower
rate of growth, and eventually lead to ﬁnancial unsus-
tainability in both the public and private sectors.
Metrics are inevitably (if perhaps only partially)
grounded in models. Many of the metrics upon which
we focus are not seen as ends in themselves but are
viewed as intermediate variables; they are of interest
because they provide insight into those things we really
care about. But the relationship between these interme-
diate variables and the things we really care about are
often uncertain, and depends on the model. And of
course there is a great deal of uncertainty about the right
model. Prior to the crisis, many believed that all a coun-
try needed to do in order to maintain high and stable
growth was to maintain low and stable inﬂation. After
the crisis, a broad consensus has emerged that low and
stable inﬂation was certainly not sufﬁcient for economic
stability. These policy conclusions were predicated on
wrong models, which encouraged economists to focus
on a single variable (inﬂation) as an indicator of the
country’s future prospects. We now know that there
should have been more focus on indicators of ﬁnancial
stability.
Assessing wellbeing
While a focus on false measures might distort policy, a
dialogue around what we as a society care about, and
whether these concerns are adequately reﬂected in our
statistics, could contribute not only to an enhanced
understanding of the limitations of our models and mea-
surements but to the formulation of better policies that
are more reﬂective of the concerns and values of citizens.
The OECD Better Life Initiative, a study released in May
2011, shows the organization’s openness to a dialogue
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with civil society. It allowed each citizen to build his own
aggregate index of the quality of life. Eleven indicators
were selected for the 34 OECD members as well as some
emerging countries, according to the domains identiﬁed
the report of the Commission on the Measurement of
Economic Performance and Social Progress. People were
asked to compute their own index by selecting the
weight of each determinant of wellbeing, through an
online interactive tool called Your Better Life Index.
Most of the determinants considered were objective
(health, employment, education, housing conditions etc)
but one was subjective, namely life satisfaction. This was
assessed through surveys. The subjective determinants of
wellbeing are obviously important: a long philosophical
tradition views individuals as the best judges of their
own situation. But they are subject to a kind of ‘time
inconsistency’ problem: they may evaluate their circum-
stance (or even a particular event) in a different way at
different points in time. While raising children, some
people may describe the activity as painful yet, just a
few years later, they may recall and describe this period
as the most satisfactory of their lives.
How to interpret and use these different results in
developing wellbeing metrics is a subject on which there
is ongoing research. The value of such research is two-
fold: there is hope that it will lead to better metrics, and
that the active engagement with civil society required to
establish such metrics will itself facilitate policies directed
at the improvement of societal wellbeing.
Surely, in the present circumstances, most countries
need more growth; but growth of what? GDP? A better
answer would be growth of wellbeing – that which mat-
ters to citizens. The shift requires most probably an
enrichment of the instruments of public policies, and a
much more selective approach to policies aimed at
increasing GDP.
Wellbeing and the business cycle
This broader and redeﬁned perspective on measurement
is relevant not only for assessing the long-term progress
of society, but also for understanding cyclical ﬂuctuations
such as the present one. Earlier we noted that before the
crisis, GDP was exaggerated; but one can also argue that,
during the crisis, the loss in wellbeing is being underesti-
mated too. Various subjective measures of people’s well-
being agree that unemployment has a very adverse
effect on people’s quality of life. People who become
unemployed report lower life evaluations, even after con-
trolling for their lower income. The adverse effects seem
to be intertemporally persistent. The unemployed also
report higher prevalence of various negative effects (sad-
ness, stress and pain) and lower levels of positive ones
(joy). One may also suspect that the adverse effects of
unemployment are felt even by those who are not them-
selves unemployed, especially in societies where unem-
ployment is widespread. These subjective measures
suggest that the costs of unemployment exceed the
income loss suffered by the unemployed, reﬂecting the
existence of nonpecuniary effects among them, and of
fears and anxieties in the rest of society.
All of this suggests that economic ﬂuctuations may
have strong adverse effects on wellbeing. Again, the pre-
valent use of GDP as the intermediate indicator results in
our not taking account of these effects explicitly – not
only on the current level of wellbeing, but also on the
‘stock’ of human capital available in and to a given soci-
ety. The economics of business cycles should then be
rethought in the light of probable discrepancies between
the ﬂuctuation of output and that of wellbeing. It may
well be better for governments to devise policies aimed
at minimizing the rate of unemployment and its variation
over the business cycle, rather than policies aimed at
maximizing output growth as measured by GDP. Some
of the instruments for implementing these two strategies
may be the same – employment concerns are central to
overall macroeconomic strategy – but surely the ﬁrst
strategy needs more complex and varied supplementary
ones to smooth the evolution of unemployment. More-
over, in light of the preceding arguments, such a strategy
will surely enhance wellbeing even if there were some
adverse effects on growth, as measured by GDP.
The design of good policies cannot be grounded on
the artiﬁcial separation between social and macroeco-
nomic ones: if the wellbeing of the people is the ultimate
end, employment, labour market analysis and income
distribution must be central components of the macro-
economic analysis supporting stabilization policies.
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